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Enclaves, Insecurity and Violence in Karachi 
Sobia Ahmad Kaker 
This paper analyses conditions of insecurity and violence in Karachi in relation to 
an emerging geography whereby the city is fragmented into various enclaves of 
business, leisure, and residence. Although enclavisation is largely viewed as a 
response to heightened urban crime and violence, the paper argues that socio-
political conditions generated by processes of enclavisation themselves create 
circumstances that generate a continuum of violence. Qualitative data from two 
selected residential enclaves within Karachi illustrate the argument. The 
experience of residents, visitors and workers within the two enclaves is 
relationally reviewed within the context of urban politics in Karachi. The 
conclusion highlights the agency of urban space in structuring conflict in Karachi 
by exacerbating differences, heightening vulnerabilities, and reconfigurestate 
society relations.     
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Introducing Violence, Insecurity and Enclavisation in Karachi 
 
With a murder rate as high as 13.49 per 100 000 in 2012, i  Karachi has been 
branded one of the most dangerous cities in the world.ii The city of 18 million residents 
is frequently victim to conflict and insecurity. Politically motivated targeted killings have 
intensified, as have terrorist and gang related violence, and everyday crimes (burglaries, 
robberies, muggings, kidnappings, vehicle snatching).iii An Rafia Zakaria reported in a 
Dawn Newspaper article on February 10, 2010, the situation is complex and it is difficult 
to cleanly separate the activities of organised crime, land mafia, labour unions, and 
ethnically oriented political groups. The violence is also hard to label. Various analyses 
point to a myriad of different motivations: as a contest between different mafia groups 
over a share of the city’s resources; an outcome of the violent tactics used by armed wings 
of political groups  employed to create or shape constituencies (such as land grabbing, 
evictions and settlements); a political tactic to disrupt the economic flows from the city 
and hence injure the national economy in order to bargain with the federal government; 
and an outcome of informal networks that emerge as a basis of contract enforcement in 
the absence or failure of formal systems of contract enforcement. iv  
In recent years, the fallout of the ‘War on Terror’ has also been increasingly felt 
in Karachi. Though the theatres of the war are located in a geographically distant part of 
Pakistan, its repercussions are felt in Karachi. Since 2001, Taliban groups have attacked 
multiple targets in Karachi: State security forces, army installations, US and NATO 
supplies, foreign consulates, five star hotels, mosques and shrines, and religious and 
political processions. The victims of these attacks are mostly ordinary urban residents. 
Between 2007 and 2012, 1360 people have been killed in terrorist attacks (suicide 
bombings and sectarian killings), and more than 2209 have been injured.v  More recently, 
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various local news articles report that Taliban groups have entrenched themselves within 
various pockets in the City, swelling the ranks of existing criminal and mafia groups. In 
some cases, they have also created their own syndicates to generate revenue for terrorist 
activities.  
In this situation, various informal settlements around the city have come under 
scrutiny. They are considered safe havens for terrorist groups seeking cover through the 
informal networks that these spaces are organised along. Many of these settlements have 
become ‘no go areas’ for police and security forces. In an article published in The 
Guardian, on February 16, 2010, Declan Walsh described such spaces as breeding 
grounds for militant political activism, and as potential hiding places for Al Qaeda 
operatives. The conflict along the Af-Pak border has displaced Pashtuns from Waziristan 
into Karachi, and most of these migrants are viewed suspiciously for having links with 
Taliban.  The entry of in-migrants from these places has also affected the balance of 
power between two political groups (ANP and MQM) who mobilise support on an ethnic 
basis with violent consequences. In most cases, heterogeneous unplanned settlements 
have become hotbeds of violence, as one group tries asserting influence over the other.  
This violence and fear of violence has had a tangible effect on Karachi’s 
landscape. Failures in provision of public safety have increased the popularity and 
demand for private security and community policing across the urban landscape.vi A 
combination of guards, walls, barriers, razor wires, checkposts, and patrols combine to 
form a security architecture that prevails across most urban spaces in Karachi today. 
Fortified enclaves now encompass spaces of leisure, business, and residence. These 
security measures are a physical manifestation of the enclavisation process, though it is 
not complete without particular practices, norms, and codes of conduct which govern 
access and in-access to such spaces.vii  
Current discourse on enclavisation and enclaved cities is not well linked with 
discourse on violent megacities. There are references to enclosures and fortifications in 
violently divided cities across Africa and Latin America, and the Middle East. These 
protective architectures are attributed to rising levels of urban violence, insecurity, crime 
and fear of crime.viii However the analysis falls short of delving into the politics of space 
to create a relational understanding of enclavisation and violence. Literature on urban 
violence in megacities of the global south points towards the reinforcing, self-
perpetuating nature of urban violence.ix According to Perlman, if the state is impotent in 
the city, and absent in the favelas, the contests over right to the city become more pressing, 
locking urban residents, especially the poor in a cycle of violence.x Field work in Karachi 
demonstrates that such conditions arise through enclavisation.  Affluent areas are 
securitized, and urban poor are subjected to state-led violence. Increasing marginality 
breeds inter-communal and personal violence, perpetuating structural and political 
violence in ‘chains, spirals and mirrors’ or the ‘continuum of violence’.xi Thus, I argue 
that by creating conditions that engender structural violence, enclavisation perpetuates 
violence that is manifested by the politics of control as well as repressive state policies. 
The intermingling of the landscapes of ‘everyday life’ and ‘international relations’ 
have also resulted in increasing the prominence of local culture and social geography in 
global security.xii Especially following the War on Terror, there is an increased interest 
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in controlling ‘ungoverned spaces’. As Graham suggests, cities are increasingly 
prominent as sites where geopolitical strategies play out.xiii The sprawling megacities of 
the global south with are termed ‘feral’xiv particularly for the risks they present to global 
security. Complimenting this stance, international development agencies progressively 
foreground security as a prerogative that showcases ‘good governance’.xv This provides 
impetuous for local governments to use security in order to invoke a special kind of 
politics where repression and states of exception are normalised. In Karachi too, 
enclavisation is often encouraged on these grounds. Though lacking capacity themselves, 
municipal authorities as well as police departments encourage organisation at the 
neighbourhood level for deployment of private security. Enclosures are facilitated and 
permitted in order to provide an effective solution for tackling the security situation.  
However, this encouragement to securitise and privatize space is selective: 
affluent areas are assisted, while similar enclavisation and privatisation in low income 
areas is viewed negatively. It is seen as strengthening of non-state actors and mafia 
groups, and hence a threat to urban security.xvi In low income settlements, local 
organisation is often the first step to political bargaining. The emergent community 
leaders often negotiate votes in exchange for public works within the settlement and the 
politics of patronage is often tied to political mobilisation. This situation is perceived as 
especially troublesome by state actors because Karachi’s security situation in deeply 
linked to crisis on local and national governance. Violence is readily deployed in and 
between ethnic enclaves by heavily armed and politically charged residents, and often 
becomes a negotiation point between differing political parties at different levels of 
control. 
This literature provides a background for examining emergent enclaves in 
Karachi. As pointed out earlier, existing literature cites enclavisation as a strategy to 
counter heightened urban insecurity and conflict. I would add another layer to this 
argument and suggest that enclavisation itself creates conditions which intensify tensions 
in urban space. The very processes tied to ensuring protection and security perpetuates 
urban violence. 
This argument is a purposeful shift from current discourse on violence in Karachi 
which essentialises informality, ethnic politics, and migrant settlement as root causes for 
urban conflict.xvii I do not refute or discredit these arguments, but instead present an 
alternative analysis foregrounding the agency of urban space in understanding conflict in 
Karachi. I argue that the division of the city into guarded enclaves plays a critical role in 
magnifying socio-political divisions in Karachi and shuffling structures of urban 
governance.  
This paper therefore suggests that conflict and violence in Karachi are 
manifestations of tensions that arise as urban residents are subjected to relational 
processes of enclavisation across the city. To support this claim, I use empirical evidence 
from two residential enclaves, Clifton Block 7 (an upper middle class gated community) 
and Sultanabad (a homogenous low income gated community in a slum settlement). The 
evidence is based on extensive qualitative field research which focuses on the politics of 
everyday life within enclaved spaces in relation to the city ‘outside’. Empirical analysis 
demonstrates how enclaves are spaces of subjectivity that create paradoxes of security 
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and insecurity, and generate vulnerabilities of inclusion and exclusion. I also demonstrate 
how such enclaves emerge as urban political actors which shift existing state-society 
relations. In conclusion, recount why enclaved urbanism in general and enclavisation in 
Karachi in particular is relevant for understanding urban conflict and violence. 
  
Understanding Enclaves through the case of Karachi 
 
The dictionary of human geography defines an enclave as ‘A small piece of 
territory that is culturally distinct and politically separate from another territory within 
which it is located…(..)….The term is increasingly used to refer to a city neighbourhood 
displaying distinctive economic, social and cultural attributes from its surroundings.’xviii 
Various authors providing empirical evidence of residential enclaves describe them as 
inward looking spaces which range in architectural form between bounded and open.xix  
These are mostly privately governed spaces that aim to restrict circulation of ‘unwanted’ 
elements through security mechanisms, membership procedures, or cultural practices. 
Such enclaves- whether gated communities, enclosed neighbourhoods, or ethnic 
enclaves- exhibit a unique political space because they are exclusionary spatial 
communities that are governed through distinct juridico-political structures.xx Enclaved 
spaces have often been explained within the framework of Agamben’s paradigm of the 
camp.xxi Such spaces are organised on values of extreme vulnerability in the face of high 
social control.  
As a phenomenon that is spread over most global cities, residential enclaves have 
gained significance in current scholarship. As Graham and Marvin suggest in their 
splintering urbanism thesis, enclaves materialise to facilitate circulation of goods, people 




xxii Such processes may be propelled by 
colonial histories of urban fragmentation, current trends of globalisation and 
deregulation, imperatives of securitisation; or a combination of these factors.  In 
creating safe havens in cities where crime and fear of crime is extremely high, enclaves 
result in shrinking public space, stifling democratic interaction and heightening contests 
over space.xxiv Enclavisation is contentious in all of the cities where it has been studied. 
Enclaved spaces have been compared to a new form of apartheid,xxv have been marked 
as sites that spatialise biopolitics,xxvi build a climate of fear,  and perpetuate social 
segregation based on socio-economic differences.   
This brief literature review supplies a background to enclavisation in Karachi. 
Field work in Karachi shows that the typologies of enclaves vary: they are not all bounded 
spaces, but each generates a distinct politics of space based on its particular genesis. The 
recently barricaded foreign consulates in Clifton and DHA, as well as places like the 
Governors House, Sindh Assembly, Sindh High Courts etc. show that not all securitised 
enclaves are built as such, but evolve into enclaves because of an increased threat of 
violence.  In some cases, enclaves may be previously bounded spaces governed through 
distinct governance structures. The various cantonment housing schemes such as Askari, 
Karsaz, and Malir are examples of such kinds of enclaves. In others cases, enclaves may 
be privately enclosed public neighbourhoods such as the recently enclosed streets in 
Mohammad Ali Society, KDA Scheme 1, Lalazar, and Clifton Block 7. Yet another type 
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is the space created in the form of no go areas that are common in many of the city’s 
sprawling low income settlements.  
For the purpose of illustrating my arguments, I will focus on two of these types of 
residential enclaves: an enclosed neighbourhood (Clifton Block 7), and Sultanabad, a low 
income settlement that has ethnic enclaves within it. I have developed the case studies 
through qualitative field research conducted in Karachi over a period of six months 
between June 2011 and September 2012. For the purpose of this paper, data collected 
through personal observations of sites and unstructured interviewsxxix is presented to 
critically interrogate enclavisation and its relation to urban politics in Karachi. The 
relationship between enclavisation, governance and security will be investigated through 
an examination of the processes of enclave formation, and emerging social relations 
between and amongst residents, visitors and other users.  
 
The elite neighbourhood: Clifton Block 7  
Clifton Block 7 is an ordinary neighbourhood housing affluent Karachiites 
which is currently undergoing enclavisation. It streets, which are public property, have 
been recently enclosed so as to restrict circulation of non-residents. Access is restricted 
through street barriers placed at all entry and exit points. The barriers are open from 
5am to 10pm, and closed through the night. Private security guards sit by the barriers to 
review those wishing to enter. CCTV cameras are also strategically placed at these 
points to supplement the guards’ gaze. 
The enclavisation process in Block 7 started in 2007 as an initiative to solve 
common neighbourhood issues which were not restricted to security. Residents along one 
lane of Block 7 were adversely affected after heavy rains in Karachi flooded a nearby 
storm water drain, causing it to overflow into their streets. When individual attempts to 
get the municipality to respond to the problem failed, a few people organised themselves 
to form Clifton Block 7 Resident’s Association (a registered legal entity). As its first task, 
the association lobbied with the department for local government municipal services to 
drain out stagnant water and get their streets cleaned up. Following its success in engaging 
the municipality, members decided to expand the charter of the association to other 
matters of collective concern, and increase memberships to add weight to their demands 
on the municipality. Amir, the president of the association reported that it was an uphill 
task to get more residents on board, particularly when the association attempted to expand 
its agenda to include costly collective security. Today, the association boasts more than 
200 members, each of whom contributes financially (by way of a fixed monthly tax) 
towards costs. This tax funds the fee for security staff, salary for the association’s hired 
area manager,xxx and other development initiatives.  
So far, the association has been successful in bargaining with the city 
administration on issues of collective security and premium municipal service delivery. 
The city administration has granted the association permission to enclose the 
neighbourhood, and has agreed cooperate with Block 7 in its private initiatives at 
apprehending potential and suspected criminals. The neighbourhood has also been 
granted municipal funding for road carpeting, park development, and installation of street 
lights. Other initiatives for neighbourhood improvement and security, such as sign-posted 
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street numbering, repair of street barriers, and installation of CCTCV cameras have been 
funded through private and corporate sponsorships.xxxi Sajid, a resident, is very pleased 
with the outcomes of enclavisation: “Our children can cycle freely in the streets, we no 
longer constantly worry about being followed home by potential muggers, and our 
property values have risen after the associations’ initiatives- everyone wants to live in a 
clean, safe environment!” 
These neighbourhood development and improvement projects have been mostly 
successful with help of volunteers who have consistently worked to develop links 
between their neighbourhood and various other governing bodies such as the town 
administration (municipal department), and public works organisations such as the 
Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC) and the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board 
(KWSB). The goal is to ensure better public service delivery through an efficient service 
management and complaint system. The Town Administrator commends this private sub 
structure of local municipal service provision: “With people taking ownership of their 
neighbourhood, Clifton Block 7 is emerging as a model neighbourhood which the city 
government can claim credit for. In an environment where it continuously faces critique 
for its failures, the successes of Block 7 as a clean, well-functioning and secure 
neighbourhood allow the city government to gain political support and credibility.”xxxii  
Residents also report that this newly emerging civic and community spirit has 
improved their lives to a great extent. The cleaner and more secure neighbourhood has 
had economic benefits for home owners, as property values in Block 7 are increasing. 
However, some residents are opposed to the associations’ work and remain non-members. 
They do not pay the monthly contribution to the association because they do not support 
the enclosures and security initiatives within the block. For Natasha, non-membership 
was a non-issue. “I don’t really know of the association and its activities” she said. “I 
know the Ismaili community has gotten together to work for their own welfare- they do 
look after each other . . . but I do think they are selfish. My friend who had a break in 
recently asked to see CCTV coverage and they refused!” Natasha felt that the association 
was exclusionary by nature because the majority of members belonged to a minority 
religious community known to be tight knit. However, non-membership is taken seriously 
by contributing members who argue that the association is for all residents irrespective 
of faith, and that non-members are purposeful free riders. “You should smash their cars, 
threaten them!” says Jamal, an aged member who feels angry that those who don’t ‘pay 
up’ free ride at his monetary expense. Amir, the president of the association also expresses 
his frustration over the involuntary inclusion of non-members to a cleaner, safer 
environment. “I strongly feel that if they (non-members) complain or seek help from the 
association for any municipal issue, the association should refuse it so that they are made 
to feel helpless,” says Azim. “I have told my security guards to out-rightly reject security 
assistance if requested by non-members”.  
The contacts and relationships developed within the municipal government by the 
Clifton Block 7 association are often exploited to push non-members to submit into 
membership. Amir highlights that public service agencies (water and sewage, electricity, 
gas) are encouraged to refuse service unless with the recommendation of the association. 
Such tactics to create distance between residents and governance agencies ensures that 
7 
 
the Block 7 Residents Association becomes a powerful mediator between the two. The 
quest for more efficient service delivery on the part of municipal agencies, and the need 
to divert public policing resources to other security imperatives combine to encourage a 
shift in the burden of responsibility for provision of public goods towards private actors. 
The processes of enclavisation thus shift the social contract in ways that devolve state 
power to privately organised committees such as the Block 7 Association.  
The tensions between members and non-members within the Block make evident 
how enclaved spaces create paradoxes of inclusion and exclusion, and security and 
insecurity. These are heightened by rules and regulations concerning use of public space. 
Service providers and domestic workers are not allowed into parks at certain times of the 
day and are discouraged from ‘loitering’ around in the streets. These limitations are 
placed to produce a sanitised space where children can bicycle on the streets, neighbours 
mingle in the park, and there is no fear of crime and insecurity. Yet, service providers that 
often live and work within the premises resent these biases. Akmal -a domestic help in 
one of the houses in Block 7- finds these rules contradictory. “That guard who says I 
shouldn’t sit in the park, who is he? He is me wearing a uniform, getting paid to push 
people who look like him off!” Other than restrictions on movement in leisure hours, 
domestic service workers also resent criminalisation. As Farzana says, “just because a 
few servants commit crimes, we all have to bear the brunt. They (employers) trust us to 
watch their children, look after their house, but would easily hand us over to the police if 
someone robs them.”  
Farzana’s comments deriding her employers’ paradoxical sense of simultaneous 
trust and insecurity are reflective of the wider neighbourhood enclave. The inclusion of 
security guards within the security architecture of enclaves generates insecurities for 
residents and managers. “I don’t like the idea of these guards watching me all the time. I 
feel more insecure knowing that they are aware of my movements and daily pattern,” says 
Samina, a resident. The system of surveillance however turns in on itself in multiple ways. 
While showing me the CCTV control room, Amir proudly says that “we tell our guards 
these cameras are watching them too- lax behaviour or involvement in criminal activities 
on their part would be seen immediately.” The very guards who perform security for the 
enclave are regarded as potentially risky bodies. They may be part of the enclaves security 
infrastructure, but they never truly belong within the enclave. Security guards, along with 
other service workers are simultaneously places inside and outside: they are bound by 
rules governing life within, but do not enjoy benefits of membership. 
Enclaved space thus produces also produces paradoxical subjectivities along 
binaries of inside and outside, included and excluded, and security and insecurity. In 
Clifton Block 7, the enclavisation process both cements and fractures the neighbourhood, 
and creates relations of power and disempowerment between different users of space. 
Parts of the neighbourhood have solidified as a community after a breakdown of 
municipal services. After successes in its collective endeavours, the association slowly 
constructed a space that is more in line with private ideals of urban life by regulating the 
usage of space for residents of the neighbourhood. While non-members enjoy the benefits 
of this privatisation, they are made to feel more excluded in times of crisis and 
breakdown, where even public agencies become inaccessible. Others excluded are the 
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numerous domestic workers such as maids, house guards, and chauffeurs. While living 
and working within the enclave, they are treated as ‘outsiders’ and are subjected to 
stringent security procedures and discriminatory rules and regulations. In enclaves such 
as Clifton Block 7, therefore, marginalised groups are pushed into a state of exception. 
Those excluded have no voice nor representation within the space produced.  
 
The marginalised settlement: Sultanabad 
Sultanabad is a densely populated inner city squatter settlement situated within 
Karachi’s security red zone. Most residents are low income service workers (house help, 
guards, and chauffeurs), or shop assistants and clerks who work in houses, offices and 
hotels in the vicinity. Current approximations place the population to be 70,000 persons, 
with the average household size being 7 to 8 persons per household.xxxiii
xxxiv
 The majority 
population is ethnic Pashtun (approximately 60% of the population), while other ethnic 
groups such as Hazara, Mohajir, Sindhi and Balochi’s also live in the settlement.  
There is also a small population of migrants originating from Gilgit-Baltistan (Baltis), 
and these are clustered in a single neighbourhood. Sultanabad is thus ethnically 
heterogeneous, though there are homogenous spatial clusters within it.  
Karachiites regard Sultanabad as an enclave. Despite not being walled and gated, 
its physical and imaginative geographies give the area an enclave-like quality. This 
sentiment was echoed by Amir (president of the Block 7 Association) who regarded 
Sultanabad as a strategically located labyrinth where “criminals enter to lose hot trails of 
pursuit”. The few wide inroads from the main road don’t fully penetrate or cross through 
the settlement, thus restricting entrants who don’t have business within. Regular news 
reports of violent riots, murders, and shootings amongst residents and between residents 
and police have added to Sultanabads reputation of being a lawless place. In fact, in a 
recent news article published by Dawn News March 31, 2013; parts of Sultanabad have 
been reported to be no go areas controlled by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The maze-
like quality of internal streets makes surveillance impossible, and there are some areas 
within Sultanabad that are off limits even for police and security forces. There have been 
incidents when police have been driven out by force, and officers of special security 
forces have been violently attacked.xxxv 
With this reputation in mind, I ventured into Sultanabad with trepidation. I gained 
entry through a local ex-union councillor who walked me through the settlement and 
introduced me to various locals. Personal observations and interviews from repeated 
visits confirmed that residents were extremely mistrustful of people from ‘outside’ 
visiting their neighbourhood.xxxvi Interviews revealed that this paranoia was a 
combination of fear of random shootings or targeted killings by outsiders at times when 
the city’s violent ethnic politics flared up, and also fear of harassment from police and 
security forces.  “We have to take our security in our own hands”, says Nishat, a resident 
and political party worker. “Political workers are routinely targeted by killers hired by 
rivals. If we don’t recognise any men walking around, we check their ID cards for ethnic 
affiliation to determine their loyalties. If they look like trouble, we ask them to leave 
immediately for their own welfare.” Ordinary residents agree that the source of violence 
is often from within the settlement. Yet they feel the police can never provide protection. 
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Kamal, a Pashtun who has lived in Sultanabad for over 40 years says “We are helpless- 
they (the new pashtun migrants into Sultanabad) are drug addicts with a backward 
mentality. They steal, beat our children up for no reason, and have brought a rural culture 
to this place.  We don’t support this talibanisation. But we can’t trust the police either- 
we have no faith in their integrity.” 
To combat the regular threats to life and property from within and outside, 
residents of Sultanabad resort to their own version of Enclavisation. Karachiites living 
outside Sultanabad deem the whole settlement an enclave, yet Sultanabad is further 
fragmented into various enclaves. The multi ethnic settlement is split into loosely 
organised ethnic clusters which look after resident/community interests. These clusters 
take the form of a mohallah- i.e. a traditional tightly knit spatial community. Some 
Mohallah’s in Sultanabad (such as the Mehsud Mohallah and Balti Mohallah amongst the 
many others) are even restricted for other residents of Sultanabad. The Mehsud Mohallah 
is not walled or gated, residents are violently protective of their turf. Habib, a worker at 
the community health centre, narrated an incident where the process of widening a road 
to allow ambulances to cut across Sultanabad was halted just outside the Mehsud 
Mohallah. “As soon as we got close to the Mehsud Mohallah, men came out with guns, 
threatening to shoot us if we continued forward.”  
Another enclave within Sultanabad, the Balti Mohallah, is actually walled and 
gated. The Balti Mohallah is one of the most tightly organised ethnic clusters in 
Sultanabad. Matters of community life are overseen by a voluntary association. The 
association is presided over by Imam, a community elder respected for his prowess over 
religious and legal issues. According to Imam, the association works towards “ensuring 
the welfare of the population by providing security and structural development in the 
Mohallah in exchange for loyalty and obedience”. The arrangement suits most residents 
who have confidence in the association’s decisions. “The elders know what’s best for us,” 
says Qaiser, a resident. “We are not allowed to sell or rent our property without their 
approval; they want to make sure this remains a Balti or at least Shia Mohallah. It is for 
our own protection.”  
The Balti Mohallah has been recently enclosed as defence mechanism against the 
neighbouring Pashtun areas which house “gun toting tribals with a Taliban mindset. The 
narrow steel gates placed at entry and exit points are locked from 11pm to sunrise. Night 
time security is supplemented by patrol; guards are hired from within the community. 
Despite these measures, residents continue to face threats. “The other day, two armed 
Pashtun men came into our Mohallah, taunting us, mocking us for being Shia muslims,” 
narrated Majid, a young Balti student. “They threatened that if we don’t vote for the 
Awami National Part (ANP), we would suffer. Our elder sorted it out, I think. He’s well 
respected in Sultanabad…that is why he is our leader.” The incident Majid spoke of was 
confirmed by the Imam. “These stupid children are full of hot air. I recognised them, and 
complained to the elders in their community of their behaviour. They were made to 
apologise soon enough, and that was the end of the matter.” When I asked Imam as to 
why he was heard, and on what basis he was able to offer protection to his community 
members, the answer was simple. “We are 300 votes,” said Imam. “Everybody in our 
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community –men, women, and young adults- are registered voters. We may be a minority 
community, but our voting power adds weight to our numbers.”  
This incident highlighted the micro-politics of everyday life in Sultanabad. 
Enclavisation is a necessary tactic to ensure protection. However, the case of Sultanabad 
shows how enclavisation is not just about walling and gating. The process is essentially 
tied to community cohesion and collective bargaining. Voting as a block ensures 
protection, and this enfranchises local community elders with respect and voice within 
the wider community. More importantly, processes of enclavisation encompass 
governance of everyday life in a violent settlement. Community affairs are managed by 
‘elders’ who are respected as community representatives to act on residents’ behalf. The 
community elders are not elected, but are appointed because of their influence over their 
community. They are tasked to build strong relationships with other elders within the 
settlement, as alliances are necessary for matters such as dispute resolution and 
infrastructural development work.  
For example, grievances in Sultanabad are settled through a ‘jirga system’. This 
is a traditional dispute settlement mechanism which tasks adjudication to respected 
community elders who are trusted to act in neutrality to both complainant and defendant. 
Residents in Sultanabad express more confidence in this traditional system for dispute 
resolution as compared to the legal system. Irfan, a clerical officer at the Karachi Port 
Trust prefers the Jirga system because he feels that “the courts are inaccessible, inefficient 
and unjust- everyone knows that judges award decisions to the party with deeper pockets! 
It takes months, sometimes years to get a judgement. The Jirga decides cases within a few 
weeks!” 
Similarly, elders also play a significant role in shaping their mohallah’s 
relationship with other communities in the settlement, dictating which local political 
candidate to support, and which particular groups to befriend or avoid. These decisions 
are usually outcomes of negotiations between various Mohallah elders, keeping in mind 
outcomes that would be beneficial for the community. For example, Imam, the 
community elder of the Balti Mohllah spoke of his alliance with Khattak, a popular 
community elder in Sultanabad as stemming from an understanding that “Khattak has ties 
with political groups who have done extensive development work in Sultanabad. He is 
progressive, open minded, and is well connected to people in power (in the city 
government). We usually follow his advice on voting and fully support him.”   
These interviews also suggest that enclaves in low income settlements are more 
than just spatial communities offering protection to marginalised urban residents. In the 
case of Sultanabad, they are politically charged spaces which empower people largely 
abandoned by the state. Residents within Sultanabad are aware of their political clout, 
and exercise their democratic freedoms often. They are quick to organise political rallies 
and participate in disruptive riots in order to negotiate their terms for ensuring order and 
acquiescence with the city and state governments.xxxvii The strength of their collective 
votes makes Sultanabad a settlement hard to ignore for local politicians vying for power. 
Thus, the case of Sultanabad highlights how the juxtaposition of 
neighbourhood/local and government/state politics results in a complex reorganization of 
citizenship and state-society relations. However, although the political spaces opened up 
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through enclavisation aid in securing residents, the resulting political space also creates 
tensions and perpetuates conflict. While enclave residents benefit from increased 
democratic voice and better access to lower tier political representatives, this voice is 
collective in nature, and is mediated through the leader of the community association. 
This increases the power of the leader in relation to individual members, almost to an 
autocratic level. Moreover, this vote politics results in increasing vulnerabilities for those 
not eligible to vote, as they are unable to find protection or representation. This is true for 
a few minority Christian families living on rent in one of the Mohallah’s in Sultanabad. 
“We are renting tenants, and are not registered to vote within Sultanabad” says Asma 
“that is why they don’t care about us. I keep going to the elders here to complain of young 
boys who rough handle my sons and daughters whenever they come home from work at 
the end of they, but no one cares about us.” As absolute minorities within the enclave and 
the rest of the settlement, families like Asma’s may live within enclaves, but live outside 
its political spaces. They do not capture the interest of any prominent ‘elders’, and it 
becomes apparent how the political structure of such enclaves reduces the marginal to 
levels of absolute vulnerability and despair. 
 
Critically Revisiting Enclavisation and Violence in Karachi 
 
The above case studies attempted to place enclaves in the context of wider 
disruptive events in Karachi. Ethnic division, infrastructural failure, and a negligent state 
allow for conditions under which enclave creation becomes a solution and a tactic to deal 
with crisis of governance, insecurity, and disruption in everyday urban living. The 
examples of Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad showcase different types or enclaves, each 
with a distinct environment, context and urban form. Yet, they also showed 
commonalities. In Block 7, enclavisation embodied a rejection of public spaces and public 
services, which were deemed as insecure, disorderly and chaotic. On the other hand, in 
Sultanabad enclaves emerged as exceptional spaces towards which the state felt no 
obligation. In both cases, social organisation and collective action became the first step 
to privatisation of space. Within this privatised space, public spirit was stoked. Political 
engagement and social networks were used to negotiate everyday life.  
At a micro-level, enclavisation results in re-ordering private and public space. As 
urban space is increasingly privatized and homogenized, seeds of differential are also 
sown. The distinct politics of space is thus ordered on lines of difference, which is 
spatialised. Although Gupta and Fergusonxxxviii argue that notions of culture and 
community can no longer be fixed to a territory because of the de-territorialized nature of 
urban interactions in mega-cities, the production of enclaved spaces brings territory 
squarely back in discussions of identity, difference and conflict. The production of 
enclaved space reconfigures notions of rights, access, community and belonging. These 
affectual binds become stronger and more fixed with the discursive and performative 
aspects of the enclave, and resulting tensions in space and circulation lead to conflict 
between ‘outside’ and ‘inside’.  
Moreover, it is also evident that such a politics of exclusion exacerbated 
marginality for more vulnerable residents and users of space. As suggested feminist 
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theories of difference suggest, identity formation is viewed as a construct and articulation 
of a more dynamic process of representation, signification and performativity which is 
intertwined with the material conditions of everyday life. xxxix These critical perspectives 
on difference lead one to understand that the relational processes of enclavistion construct 
racialised identities. This process is embedded in frameworks of power, and the subject 
is seen as socially constructed. This is linked with Judith Butler’s theory of 
performativity, where naming is an identity constituting performance. This is elaborated 
as an attribute of power that uses discourse to establish a criteria of identification through 
which the subject then comes to be known. Grounded in structures of governmentality, 
institutions and relational frameworks of power, such discourses not only create 
subjectivities but also determine their rights and privileges.xl Emerging enclaves 
constitute identities of different social groups: the affluent as safe, the poor as risky, which 
then govern issues of rights and access within and between urban enclaves. 
Enclaves therefore are highly political spaces. Not only do they create various 
subjectivities, but they also delineate a fractured urban polity. The two case studies 
presented show emerging forms of citizenship are fragmented and splintered in enclaved 
spaces. Organisational forms produced by such enclaves- in these cases the Clifton Block 
7 association, and the various elders guiding communities in Sultanabad- displace the 
social contract and hence re-configure state-society relations. This is echoed by Alsayyad 
and Royxli who emphasise that the changing forms of citizenship in enclaved cities are 
reminiscent to medieval times by being ’linked to either patronage (as in the bishop) or 
to associational membership (as in the guild) and in both cases it is fundamentally about 
protection… such forms of citizenship substitute for or are even hostile to the state.’xlii  
The fact that all such enclaves in Karachi create conditions of possibility of 
hostility towards the state is largely ignored by the city’s government. Fieldwork in 
Karachi shows that the state has its own selective biases towards enclavisation: affluent 
areas such as Block 7 are assisted, while similar enclavisation and privatisation in low 
income areas is viewed negatively by state authorities. In low income groups, the process 
is thought to strengthen non-state actors and mafia groups, and is hence considered a 
threat to urban security. State representatives do not consider how resulting structures of 
governance that emerge through processes of enclavisation in affluent as well as poor 
areas equally appropriate governmentality from state institutions.  
Nor do they recognise that processes of enclavisation are relational, and its ties 
with violence and insecurity are circular. When elite enclaves criminalise the urban poor, 
police brutality and state violence is pushed into low income settlements. Increased 
marginality and insecurity push poor urban residents towards protection racketeers or 
prominent elders who secure residents from a repressive state. In ethnically 
heterogeneous settlements, violence is exacerbated by the very political sociology of 
enclaved urbanism. Community organisation, vote politics, ethnic affiliation, and power 
and politics combine to form a heady mix that explodes in violence. This is supported by 
evidence from Karachi which suggests that community associations can easily morph into 
violent, ethnocentric bodies.xliii 
This paper merely serves as an introduction to a broader research agenda that 
studies how the division of Karachi into enclaves creates a crisis of security. In a city 
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where ethnicity, language, religious beliefs, and political affiliation are all potentially 
volatile markers of identity, this paper tries to argue that enclavisation adds another 
dimension to identity construction. Similarly, both cases highlight how enclaved space 
produces subjectivities through notions of inside and outside, and security and insecurity; 
simultaneously generating marginality as well as empowerment. Finally, I have argued 
that the relational nature of enclavisation makes it is impossible to separate the violent 
consequences of enclavisation from the violence and insecurity which pushed the process 
in the first place. 
Thus, it can be assumed that this kind of urban form generates a continuum of 
violence: Enclaves emerge as a tactic to deal with insecurity, while at the same time 
causing contests in space which result in perpetuating violence. In this way, urban space 
itself is agential in generating conflict and violence in the city. 
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